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Abstract: 
 
Intellectual Property Protection serves two purposes. The first is to encourage innovation by 
granting patent holders monopoly rights to their inventions for fixed periods of time. The second 
is to speed up innovation by allowing patent holders to license their inventions and obtain 
royalties. While few doubt the economic benefit of the system and its ability to foster innovation, 
empirically assessing the value of a patent to a firm has proved exceptionally difficult.  Important 
in its own right, the question is even more important for developing and improving patent policy. 
 
This paper uses patent citations as a measure of patent value in an attempt to quantify the impact 
patents have on a firm’s value. Patent citations both reflect the vast heterogeneity in patent value 
and capture the breadth of the patent by observing the number of areas in which it is later cited. 
As such, they provide a more direct measurement of patent value. Results find however, that all 
these variables are statistically insignificantly different from zero, and a discussion of potential 
explanations is given. At the very least, the relationship between number of citations received by 
a particular patent and its impact on firm value is proven far more complex than suggested by the 
previous literature, suggesting the need for further research. 
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Section I: Introduction 
A patent provides a government sanctioned monopoly for a set period of time, usually 
twenty years, subject to the payment of maintenance fees. Patent holders are encouraged by the 
potential supranormal profits, hence the considerable effort by many to develop new products.  
From society’s perspective, four rationales exist to tolerate the efficiency cost imposed by such 
monopolies: (1) patents encourage innovation, (2) patents encourage the disclosure of that 
invention once made, (3) patents enable companies to invest enough to produce and 
commercialize the product, and (4) patents encourage further innovation in areas of societal 
interest (Mazzoleni and Nelson 1998). The vast majority of patents, about 80% (Hall et al. 2001), 
are in the hands of corporations (as opposed to individuals). Clearly firms must derive benefit 
from holding these patents and the monopoly rights that come with the patents. But how much? 
Patent values vary dramatically, and evaluations of patent prices necessitate expert patent 
attorneys and valuation teams,1 an expensive and time-consuming affair. Even so, results are not 
guaranteed. Indeed, even companies providing patent valuation services acknowledge that their 
models may not reflect the value of the patent since this value “cannot be quantified by 
conventional valuation theories, such as sales value or licensing value”.2 
It is important to determine a quick and relatively accurate measure of the value of a 
patent. As production can be outsourced to the lowest cost producer anywhere in the world, from 
the point of view of the firm, intellectual property is increasingly valuable relative to the physical 
production of individual products. To give but one example, most of the value in the ipod is paid 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See “Steps for Pricing a Patent” 
http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/Issues/2004/Nov/20StepsForPricingAPatent.htm 
2 Patent Value Predictor website:  http://www.patentvaluepredictor.com/FAQs.asp 
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to Apple for the originality of the concept, rather than to the multiple manufacturers who 
complete the manual work.3 From the perspective of society, the private benefit earned by firms 
need to be determined in order to contrast it with social costs and come up with patent 
optimizing policies. 
Early work in this topic focused on the theoretical aspects, concerned with developing 
models of “optimal patent length and breadth”, with empirical studies hindered by the lack of 
available data. Indeed, the few studies that used patent data (Schmookler [1966], and Griliches 
[1990]) were limited to simple patent counts. This has recently changed, with more detailed and 
better organized patent information made available online. This rich new information source 
enabled Hall et al. to use patent citations data to proxy patent value. While an obvious 
improvement on previous work, they do not adjust their measure of patents for the scope of the 
patent, and the number of previous inventions a patent is based upon.  This paper endeavors to 
improve the existing literature on patent valuation by explicitly incorporating these two factors.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II presents the literature 
review. Section III discusses the theory behind my conceptual model and presents the ideal data. 
Section IV describes the actual data and highlights some of the limitations it places on the study. 
Section V presents and explains the general model and results.  Section VI concludes. 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3  “An Ipod has global value. Ask the (many) countries that make it”. The New York Times, 28 June 2007  
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/28/business/worldbusiness/28scene.html 
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Section II: Literature Review 
2.1 Basic Theory 
The early patent literature focuses on maximizing the dynamic benefits of innovation 
while taking into account the static costs brought by monopoly power to welfare. The ‘canonical’ 
approach dates back to the work of W. D. Nordhaus [1967] and Scherer [1972], and focuses on 
the value of patents to increase innovation. It is assumed that the inventors are working on 
different, non-competing creations, and therefore stronger patent protection improves the 
incentives to invest in research and development, providing more monopoly rents. By contrast, 
later literature, exemplified by Klemperer [1990], and Gilbert and Shapiro [1990], assumes that 
imitation is costless, and thus always a threat to the first innovator. In this tradition, patents are 
more valued as tools encourage disclosure. In his model of the trade-off between patent length 
and breadth, Klemperer considers the problem in a model of spatial product differentiation: a 
larger patent breadth corresponds to a larger region in the product space being included in the 
patent (scope), and hence is more valuable to the firm. Gilbert and Shapiro, on the other hand, 
emphasize the social cost aspect: the extent of substitution away from the patented product, and 
its associated deadweight loss, will rise as patents become “broader”. They conclude that in a 
homogeneous product model, long-lived but narrow patents are socially optimal, as narrow 
definitions allows for more inventors to be rewarded. In both cases however, inventions are 
treated as discrete actions while innovation is increasingly cumulative.  
Scotchmer [1991], and Gallini [1992] identify the problem created by treating inventions 
as discrete rather than as a cumulative process: patents have externalities and spillovers, so it 
becomes difficult to optimally reward both early and later innovators for their contributions: 
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temporal issues add another dimension to the trade-off between length and breadth. More 
directly to the point of this paper, this changes the value of patents to firms, as they have to 
contend with the additional issue that a longer patent may create the incentive for rivals to 
“invent around” the patent, thereby decreasing its usefulness to the firm. Such theoretical debates 
however, cannot be resolved without an empirical estimation of patent value and its impact on 
firms. 
2.2 Empirical Work 
The key empirical question hinges upon estimating the value of each patent. Using 
surveys to the holders of about 2% of the patents granted in 1938, 1948, and 1952, Sanders, 
Rossman and Harris [1958] find that 75% of the patents were reported to have economic value to 
assignees. More specifically, they find that 57% of the patents were used or about to be used in 
the firm’s primary industry and another 11% having had or expected to have other benefits. 
Surveys helps us to better understand the opinion of firms on how useful their patents are, and 
manages to gain such insight in an era when patent data were scarce. This approach, however, 
does not consider either the costs of patents to firms such as renewal costs, or time spent on 
application or in defending them from litigation. Nor, for that matter, does it give a quantitative 
measure of the actual patent value.  
One of the main problems in attempting to quantify the value of a patent is the implicit 
nature of many of the costs and benefits. Indeed, a large body of literature focuses simply on the 
question of “how to develop the appropriate proxies” rather than the central question of how to 
estimate the value itself. For example, a firm needs to take into account potential litigation costs 
arising from infringement: how much is the firm willing to spend to defend its patents? Having 
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more patents could either decrease the costs of litigation, with the other firms are afraid of 
infringing, or in contrast increase the risk of litigation, with the firm has to protect more patents. 
Lanjow and Schankerman [2001] show that such implicit costs are not easily incorporated into a 
model. In addition, as Bessen and Meurer [2005] show, litigation also brings strong disincentives 
for private individuals to litigate against larger firms, firms with more patents. Patents thus serve 
additional functions, whose values may not be reflected in an economic model.  
How then, should we take all these factors into consideration when valuing a firm’s stock 
of patents? The increased availability of patent data, exemplified recently by the work of Hall et 
al. [2001], [2005], may help answer this question. With all the relevant information on the 
invention and the person to which it is assigned now put on record upon the granting of a patent, 
detailed patent data is now available.   
This is not to say that no previous work was done on patent data. Scherer [1965] 
manually classifies a sample of 15,000 patents into “industry of origin” and “industries of use”, 
plotting a detailed technology flow of the degree to which innovation is promoted in different 
areas by the presence of a patent. Schmookler [1965] maps patent counts to specific industries, 
focusing on determining the inter-industrial similarities and differences. Finally, Griliches [1990] 
matches patents to external stock market measures of firms’ value using Compustat data. All 
three of these authors recognize the potential usefulness of patent data in helping estimate patent 
value and control for industrial differences. At the time however, the only widely available 
patent data was a simple patent count. They are thus unable to capture the variation in patents’ 
technical and economic importance, as demonstrated by Pakes and Schankerman [1987]. Using 
data from the U.K, France, and Germany, these authors use renewal cost schedules as a measure 
for patent value, arguing that the patent holder’s willingness to pay for extensions is better 
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indication of patent value. This measure however, does not take into account new patents filed, 
although they obviously are also part of the firm’s stock of knowledge. Clearly, the value of both 
older and new patents should be taken into account when considering the sum of patent values 
within a firm.  
Patent citations provide a potential solution. First, they delimit the scope of property 
rights awarded by each new patent, and enable the tracing of spillovers from inventions: Patent B 
has to cite patent A if it employs knowledge previously patented by A. Legally, it will have to 
pay for the privilege of using that information, reducing its value and increasing the value of 
patent A. Citations are thus a fairly direct indicator of the “importance” of individual patents, 
with the variation in patent value reflected in the varying number of citations. Additionally, 
citations are also indicative of the ex-post value of the innovations disclosed. Trajtenberg [1990] 
demonstrates the close association between citation-based patent indices and measures of the 
value of innovation in the case of Computed Tomography scanners, results validated and 
broadened by Hall et al. [2005]’s analysis of a variety of patents. While the Hall et al. work 
represents an important advancement in this literature the authors do ignore two key factors 
affecting patent value: the scope, and the number of citations made by the patent to previous 
patents.  
  This paper examines the importance of these two variables in addition to the number of 
citations received as indicative of patent value. For example, a broader patent, one that has 
applications in more technological fields is expected to have a positive impact on firm value as 
the firm may earn profit from licensing out its patents to other firms. In terms of number of 
citations given, a patent could be more valuable if it is based on a large number of previous 
patents, or alternatively it can be more valuable because it is very innovative, based on few 
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patents. It is hoped that this paper will contribute to the literature on patent valuation and shed 
new light on the more fundamental questions of benefits and costs of patents. 
 
III. Conceptual Model: Theory and Ideal Data 
3.1 Modeling Firm Behavior 
Firms will want to maximize the value off their company, and can choose to invest in 
physical capital, human capital (such as improving the education and skills of its workforce), or 
invest in knowledge capital represented by patent holding. The third option is attractive: 
investing in human capital is risky as employees might leave the company, while patents are held 
by the firm until and unless it wishes to sell it, patents provide a basically assured stream of 
revenue. Upfront costs however, are high, so for a firm to be willing to engage in such activity, 
the long-run revenue should be maximized, and costs minimized. Figure 1 illustrates the issue. In 
the beginning, the firm has to incur a large cost as it invests in developing a new product; later, 
as the firms becomes more proficient, costs are lower as they consist mostly of fabrication and 
patent application costs. As the firm obtains a patent, the savings and earnings of the firm 
increase. Eventually, the patent expires, and savings decrease until the patented invention is fully 
obsolete or perfect competition drives profits to zero. 
Under the assumption that a firm engages in patenting, a simple profit-maximizing model 
(Figure 2) summarizes the tradeoff between “quantity” and “price” (or quality). The value of the 
stock of knowledge held by the firm depends on both the quantity of patents held as well as the 
“price” or the value associated with the patents. The profit from a firm’s knowledge stocks will 
be the product of the two parameters, and firms will seek to find the balance between the number 
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and “quality” of patents maximizing benefits. The important question then becomes “how does 
the firm ‘choose’ these parameters”? Time horizon may play a role in this: firms may not know 
how valuable a patent will be when filling but gain more knowledge through time, and 
potentially increasing the weight they place on quality over quantity. One criticism of this theory 
is that firms do not actually behave in this way, as the difficulty of estimating patent “quality” is 
the very reason why there is continuing research in this area. However, even if this may be the 
case, this does not affect my estimation of firm value using patent data. Indeed, it may explain 
the persisting rapid increase in patenting despite the potentially low value of most of these 
patents. A more critical issue is the fact that innovation is a dynamic process as modeled in 
Kamien and Schwartz (1982), but lack of time constrains my results to the static model. 
Interesting observations however, can be reached even under the static model. 
 
3.2 Modeling Firm Value 
Following the work of Trajtenberg [1990] and Hall et al. [2005], patent citations can be 
matched to the stock market value of a firm. Yet the value of each patent is not only based upon 
the number of citations it receives, but also affected by its scope and the number of citations it 
makes to previous patents. In terms of scope, a broader patent is expected to have a positive 
impact on firm value, as the firm may earn profit from licensing out its patents to other firms. 
The signs on number of citations made and received are more ambiguous. A patent could be 
more valuable because it is innovative and thus able to capture all the revenue from developing a 
product, or on the contrary be more valuable through being based on a wide number of patents. 
Generally, I hypothesize that patents based on a large number of other patents as measured by 
the number of citations reduces the value of a patent, while receiving citations is a positive 
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indicator of the patent value. Finally, patent length is another parameter affecting patent value, 
but with the data coming from one country and one year, length is taken as constant. The basic 
estimating equation for the model is thus: 
(1): y = B0 +B1 X1 +B2 X2 + B3 X3 
Where y is equal to firm value, X1 is the scope of the firm, X2 is the number of citations a firm’s 
patents give, and X3 the number of citations the firm receives.  
 
IV. Summary Statistics 
4.1 Dataset and Limitations 
The dataset merges two sets of variables. The first comes from NBER and the work of 
Hall et al [2001], and contains all the patents granted by the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO) during the period January 1 through December 30, 1996. Patents are then 
matched with the firms that own them through matching assignee codes with specific firms. 
Patent entries were checked manually, deleting all the patents for which stock market data were 
missing (for example, patents owned by foreign firms or private firms). The results were then 
combined with the stock market measurement of firm value, as measured by the Wall Street 
Journal’s February 2002 Shareholder scoreboard4.  Two measures are of employed from this 
dataset: the average five-year return in percentages, and its relative surplus/deficit to other firms 
in the industry. Ultimately, the data set contains 19093 patents owned by 216 different U.S. 
firms. 1996 was selected because it was far enough away from the end of the NBER dataset to 
avoid the major truncation problems at the end of that dataset (1998, 1999). A 5-year period then 
gives patents enough time to accumulate citations, leading to a 2001 estimation of firm value. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Wall Street Journal Shareholder Scoreboard, February 25, 2002. Sources: Rankings are by L.E.K. 
Consulting LLC, based on data from Dow Jones &co; Media General Financial Services, a unit of Media 
General Inc., and Tradeline.com, a unit of Platinum Equity LLC. 
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Variables in the final dataset are summarized in table 1. The proxy for patent scope is the 
number of claims in different technological areas that the patent citations appear in. The firm’s 
scope is more problematic. While it is true that it could be proxied by a simple summation of the 
scope of individual patents (absolute scope), it is not ideal as claims could be repeated when 
summing across patents, and a simple number count does not reflect this. To decrease this error, 
the average scope of the patents could be used. Ideally of course, scope of the firm would be a 
summation of the individual scopes, taking into account duplicates. A more accurate measure 
would be to use the number of categories under the SIC codes, but the lack of data and time does 
not allow for this in the present study. Ideally, it would be possible to match the impact of the 
scope of each patent on firm value, but we are unable to disaggregate the data to that level.  The 
other two variables, “numbers of citations made and given for individual patents” are directly 
summed to get firm level data. One obvious potential problem is selection bias, leading to bias in 
the relationship between patent citations and stock market performance, but it is unavoidable due 
to the absence of such data for private firms for example. Also, it would be ideal if the study 
replicated the work by Hall et al. and simply added measures for the missing variables, but 
because the patents were not matched individually to firms, this is also something we are unable 
to do. 
 
4.2 Summary Statistics 
An examination of the dataset, through a historical lens, as Hall et al. [2005] is helpful. 
To give one example, they were able to conclude that the area of Computers and Communication 
has received a rapidly increasing average number of citations, from the lowest position in 1965 
to the highest in 1975. While the trends are fascinating, they are not the focus of this paper, and 
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are not included here.  
Summary statistics are given in Table 2. Although variations are large for all variables 
in the dataset, it is possible to note some important facts. First, on average, a patent is usually 
cited about 30 times as more than the number of patents on which it is based.  That this ratio is 
positive, suggests that firms do bring innovation in their patents, and do not just “patent for the 
sake of patenting”.  In absolute terms, firms have grown in value, albeit only an average of 
1.14% per year over 5 years. The fact that the relative growth value is negative however, 
suggests that other, smaller firms, with hypothetically fewer patents, may have done better than 
the large firms with numerous patents. This would bring doubt to the hypothesis that patents are 
used just for their economic value bringing royalties, but rather they may be used for other 
reasons. Most importantly, there are large standard deviations compared to the means for each 
variable, a high variation across all areas making these statistics hard to interpret directly. 
 
V. Analysis  
5.1 Estimating Equation 
The estimating equation, rephrased slightly, is: 
(2) Firm Value = f (∑ Patent Value) 
= α+β1(Patent Scope) +β2(Citations Given by Firm) + β3 (Citations Received by Firm) 
 
Where firm value is either the average 5-year return or the relative surplus/deficit compared to 
the industry. For scope, as argued previously, average patent scope seems to be a more logical 
choice. The scope is thus proxied by the average number of claims patents owned by the firm. 
Number of citations given and number of citations received by the firm are simple summations 
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of the same variables for individual patents. 
 
5.2 Results and Analysis:  
The basic model is run on both absolute and relative values of firm return, with results 
fairly similar for the two cases. Analysis however, must be cautious since no variables are 
actually significant even at the 10% level (with the exception of scope in the absolute firm value 
model). In effect, there are no results statistically different from zero. That is not too surprising, 
as average returns to shareholders and other measures of firm value are much more likely to be 
affected by short-term business conditions such as losses and other more direct measures of the 
firm’s well being instead. The values of knowledge stocks, results suggest, are not as well 
reflected in measures of firm value. Of course, if this is indeed the truth, then trying to model 
firm and patent value through citations may not hold, unlike what the limited preceding 
empirical literature has argued and potentially new approaches will have to be sought out. It is 
also possible, as will be explained in more detail later, that this low significance could be due to 
the limited nature of the data, restricted as it is to only 216 of the largest public firms; or because 
the firms that own the patents are not the ones who actually use and truly benefit from the patent. 
Yet another explanation would be that patents and citations are used not just for their economic 
value, but also for other reasons the model is unable to account for, creating issues of omitted 
variable bias. All these will be discussed in detail later in the paper.  
That being said, we should still take a look at the results, summarized in Tables 3 and 4. 
In the absolute return case, scope has a positive value of 0.002281, and an impact of 0.105555 in 
the relative return case. In both situations, it is in accord with theory. More interesting is the fact 
that it is so much more positive for the relative value of the firm. This difference is likely to be 
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explained when we also take a look at the constants: in the absolute firm value situation, the 
constant is a relatively large positive number, while it is a large negative in the case of the 
relative firm value. It is thus not surprising that the positive impact associated with having a 
broader scope will be more evident under a situation where overall the negative impact is more 
dominant. This is reflected in comparing the significance of the variable across the models, with 
a t- statistic of 0.02 in the absolute value situation, and a t-statistic of 0.95 in the relative value 
case. Indeed, the standard error on this coefficient in the absolute case is orders of magnitude 
larger than the coefficient whereas the standard error, albeit large, is smaller than the coefficient 
in the relative value case. 
Turning next to the number of citations made, the coefficients are negative in both cases 
(-0.0004112 compared to -0.000175). This suggests that the effect of making additional citations, 
taking away royalties paid to use someone else’s patent, dominates the value that is gained from 
cumulative innovation. Indeed, as I learned through informal discussions with patent lawyers, 
they advocate clients to not patent inventions needing to make many citations, as the lack of 
innovation may make it more vulnerable to litigation attacks.  
What is interesting is that the number of citations a firm receives is also negatively 
related to the firm value in both situations (-0.000016 compared to -0.000053). It is true that 
results are not significant and that the overall impact of this variable in light of the other two is 
extremely small (about twice as small as the impact of citations given and two thousand times as 
small as the impact of scope in both situations). This result could also be a result of selecting a 
poor proxy for scope.  Taking the results as they are however, it is possible that more citations do 
not bring as much benefit as not disclosing the innovation and keeping a trade secret would. This 
is a troubling sign when the whole rationale of having patents is to encourage disclosure of what 
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would otherwise be kept secret, and suggests that potentially, the benefits of patents are not large 
enough. This negative relationship is indeed repeated even when running firm value on just the 
number of citations received, as summarized in Tables 7 and 8.  
Comparing the relative impacts of the variables through elasticities (Table 5 and 6) scope 
has a larger impact than citations made when using the relative measure of firm value, while the 
opposite it true when using the absolute measure of firm value. Finally, in the original model, the 
constant is positive in the case of the absolute value, but negative in the case of relative value. 
This suggests that even though overall the firms have grown, smaller firms in the industry, firms 
with likely fewer patents, have outperformed them. Yet many firms still hold many patents 
despite the seemingly negative impact on value, suggesting that patents are not necessarily used 
for their economic value in bringing royalties, but potentially for other purposes. For example, as 
complementary literature from political science has often pointed out, firms may engage in 
defensive patenting, with patents providing protection against infringements. In an era of 
increased litigation, it is a worthwhile benefit, but whose value cannot be included in citations 
data. Alternatively, another potential explanation for the low level of correspondence between 
the variables and firm value could be due to the fact that patents do not necessarily benefit the 
firms that they are assigned to, but rather the firms that own them. Using a recent example, the 
pharmaceutical company Myriad Genetics derives revenue from leasing two patents on the 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, but the actual owner of the patents is listed as the University of Utah 
Research Foundation5.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Hamblett, Mark. “Genes Linked to Breast, Ovarian Cancers Are Ruled Unpatentable” New York Law 
Journal. March 30, 2010. Accessible at: 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202447064274&Genes_Linked_to_Breast_Ovarian_Cancers_A
re_Ruled_Unpatentable 
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Going back to the data, comparing the fitted versus actual values (Figures 3 and 4), the 
relative value model is a much better predictor of actual firm values. It seems thus more 
important to compare how firms fared in relation to other firms in the industries more than their 
absolute returns. This makes sense, as a firm that does poorly in general may still be the best one 
in its area, while a firm with good returns may still overall be less valuable as it lags behind its 
competitors. This is the dimension most firms consider in any case: there is no reason for a firm 
in pharmaceuticals to compare themselves to a chip-making company. Echoing the work of 
Scherer and Schmookler, this fact also encourages us to next look at the inter-technological 
differences as a potential explanation for the results. These differences are indeed also reflected 
in the residual plots (Figure 5 and 6), with the largest scope firms in areas such as chemicals and 
electronics. Finally, while there are no violations of the classical assumptions, with a Breusch-
Pagan test yielding chi-square values of 1.72 and 0.41 compared to the critical value of 6.25, and 
a VIF test for multicollinearity giving a highest and average value of 1.01, the model still should 
be changed. Hopefully, this will also increase the significance of the results. 
Inter-technological Comparison 
The firms under investigation, being large public-held companies, often have patents in 
multiple technological categories. As defined by Hall et al. [2001], 6 main categories exist, and 
patents may well be used differently from one to the other. The categories are: Chemical 
(excluding drugs); Computers and Communication (C&C); Drugs and Medical (D&M); 
Electrical and Electronics (E&E); Mechanical (M); and Others. We then run a simple regression 
of the number citations disaggregated by category on both absolute and relative measures of firm 
value. Results however, remain highly insignificant, which does not enable us to make any 	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conclusions as to the relative impact of the variables.  Clearly, the problems previously 
mentioned in attempting to measure firm value through patent data are not overcome in anyway 
by this disaggregation. That being said, some observations may still be hazarded. 
Results are summarized in Table 7 and 8. First, a look at the absolute results: having an 
additional citation does have a small positive effect, as expected by theory, in areas such as 
Computers and Communication (category 2), Drugs and Medical (category 3), and Others 
(category 6). The negative impact is only seen in the other three areas. Results in the relative 
value model on the other hand, have patent citations in categories 1 and 6 associated with higher 
firm value. Combining the results, we see that holding patent citations from categories 1, 2, 3 and 
6 may be easy seen as positive or negative depending on which measure of firm value is looked 
at, thus potentially explaining the fact that they build up the number of patents and patent 
citations they hold. More patent citations in Electrical and Electronics (category 4), and 
Mechanical (category 5), however, are correlated with lower firm values in both situations.  
Even if we do ignore the low significance of results, these results could simply be a result 
of different business conditions for the two groups over the same time period, and those firms 
happened to have done poorly, or that patents in these categories use citations differently. In any 
case, the lack of significant results further hinders our ability to interpret results. While we can 
say that the models do not suffer from problems of heteroskedasticity or multicollinearity, we 
cannot conclude that either variable is useful in determining patent and firm value, at least the 
way we measured it. This is disappointing, but as stated previously, this is unsurprising due to 
the numerous problems present with the data and models.  
In addition to the previously stated problems, the data is further limited since it includes 
only 216 of the 1000 largest publicly traded firms in the United States in the year 2001. Many 
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smaller public firms, as well as private and foreign firms, are not included in the dataset, further 
weakening the robustness of the results. Yet the firms present dramatic variations in how well 
they did over this time period. It is thus likely that even with a larger and more diverse sample, 
results would not change, though they may become more significant. In addition, the problem of 
finding a good proxy for both patent and firm scope may also affect the validity of the results. 
With more time, an investigation into the number of product categories (measured by SIC codes) 
each firm owns would probably be a better measure for scope. An additional consideration is the 
validity of using a static model in a dynamic process such as innovation. With more time the 
study ought to be repeated using Kamien and Schwartz’s 1982 dynamic model, yielding 
potentially different results. These would be worthwhile avenues to further pursue, but lack of 
time constrains my results to the static model. We are able to conclude however, that the 
relationship between patent citations, patent value and firm value is much more complex than the 
limited empirical work so far have concluded, suggesting the need for extensive further research. 
Finally, in terms of methodology, even if the results were significant, the approach is only able to 
estimate the value of past patents, looking back retroactively. It would not be able to measure the 
value of a new patent, which the firm may wish to get an estimate for when coming up with the 
invention.  
VI. Conclusion 
  Ultimately, this study argues that we cannot conclude that either number of citations 
given or received by a patent, nor its scope, is significant in contributing to the value of the 
patent as reflected through firm value. While this seems to be in opposition with the theory and 
the previous limited empirical works however, a number of potential explanations were 
advanced. At the same time, however insignificant, it was heartening to see that patent scope and 
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number of citations made did have the expected signs. Potentially, this relationship would be 
further confirmed with increased data. Certainly more research will be needed to explain the 
puzzling relationship observed between firm value and the number of citations received, even if 
it too is statistically insignificant. This potentially does reflect the reality of the relationship: in 
the real world, many patent thickets exist. Perhaps more care in choosing inventions to patent 
would make number of citations more indicative of the patent value, and through it, firm value. 
Further evidence for this is gained from the observation that the relative firm value is 
consistently estimated to be negative. Most firms in the dataset have done poorly compared to 
the industry despite being the largest and biggest patent owners, potentially as patent owners are 
not the ones who are necessarily using the patent. A mapping of the latter would probably also 
help raise the significance of the results. Overall, the limited results provide evidence of a 
complex relationship between patents, citations and firm value, one that needs to be investigated 
in more detail before we can conclude whether “more patent citations unambiguously mean a 
higher patent and firm value”, as argued by Hall et al. 
 Similar ideas are echoed when looking at the difference between industries, for while 
results were not significantly difference across technological categories; there are still trends that 
could be significant. Computers and Communication and Drugs and Medicines for example, are 
areas where cumulative innovation is potentially more beneficial in terms of absolute average 
returns to shareholders. Results differ somewhat if cast in terms of relative firm value:  in that 
case, holding increased number of citations in the area of chemicals is associated with a higher 
relative value. While the mixed nature of the results and their relative insignificance suggests 
that more work needs to be done before conclusions can be reached, it remains that firms ought 
to consider more carefully how they use patents and patent citations, for example firms with 
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patents in Electrical and Electronics (category 4), and Mechanical (category 5). On a broader 
level, the inter-industry differences should be understood to investigate more fundamental 
questions as to the overall benefits and costs of patents to society as well as to firms. If firms are 
not using the patents appropriately and not earning revenue as predicted, it is likely that the 
balance between firm benefits and social cost is also not the appropriate one. Further attempts at 
patent optimization will need to solve the issues here raised before significant progress can be 
made in that area. The topic of patents is a broad one, spanning many questions of societal 
interest, but basic empirical questions need to be resolved before these can be answered. As the 
paper points out, this is far from being the case. 
Ultimately though, even if we accept the results despite the low significance, the whole 
analysis hinges upon assuming that the value of a patent lies in its ability to earn royalty revenue 
by having others pay for it, not in its other characteristics such as prevention of litigation. This is 
a literature that remains lacking in economical research, but has developed in the political 
science and legal studies realms, with the problem how to include those more implicit costs in 
economic models. Clearly, we are unable to estimate a quick “rule of thumb” measure of value 
using citations data, despite the initially promising nature of the data. At least for now, firms will 
still have to engage in expensive patent valuation by “experts”.  
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TABLES 3-4: Model results by Absolute and Relative Value 
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Table 5-6: Elasticities of Variables 
Table 5: Absolute Firm Value - Elasticities 
Scope 0.035213526 
Citations Made -0.373665515 
Citations Received -0.004072194 
 
Table 6: Relative Firm Value - Elasticities 
Scope -0.625890985 
Citations Made 0.061080645 
Citations Received 0.005181077 
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Table 7-8: Patent Citations Received as predictor for Firm Value 
Table 7: 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: 
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Table 9:  Patent Citations, disaggregated by Technological Area, as predictor for Absolute Firm 
Value 
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Table 10:  Patent Citations, disaggregated by Technological Area, as predictor for Relative Firm 
Value: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*** Significant at 1% confidence level 
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Figure 1: Investment Costs and Returns over time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Profit Maximizing under a Monopoly 
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Figure 3: Predicted vs Actual Value (Absolute Firm Value) 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Predicted vs Actual Value (Relative Firm Value) 
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Figure 5: Residual vs Scope (Absolute Firm Value) 
 
 
Figure 6: Residual vs Scope (Relative Firm Value) 
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Figure 7: Number of Citations by Technological Category as predictor of Absolute Firm Value, 
Fitted Values vs Actual Values Plot 
 
 
Figure 8: Number of Citations by Technological Category as predictor of Relative Firm Value, 
Fitted Values vs Actual Values Plot  
 
